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To provide for this future, the Apoptotic Computing 
project has been working since 2002 toward the long-term 
goal of programmed death by default for computer-based 
systems.2-6 Motivated by the apoptosis mechanisms in 
multicellular organisms, apoptotic computing can be 
considered a subarea of bio-inspired computing, natural 
computing, or autonomic systems. Two example applica-
tions are autonomic agent-based environments and swarm 
space exploration systems.
BIOLOGICAL APOPTOSIS
Developing a self-managing computer system is the 
vision of autonomic computing.7-9 As the “Autonomic 
System Properties” sidebar explains, an autonomic com-
puting system is analogous to the biological nervous 
system, which automatically maintains homeostasis 
(metabolic equilibrium) and controls responsiveness to 
external stimuli. For example, most of the time you are 
not consciously aware of your breathing rate or how fast 
your heart is beating, while touching a sharp knife with 
your finger results in a reflex reaction to move the finger 
out of danger.10
If you cut yourself and start bleeding, you treat the 
wound and carry on without thinking about it, although 
pain receptors will induce self-protection and self- 
configuration to use the other hand. Yet, often the cut will 
have caused skin cells to be displaced down into muscle 
tissue.11 If the cells survive and divide, they have the po-
tential to grow into a tumor. The body’s solution to this 
situation is cell self-destruction (with mounting evidence 
A t the 2009 International Joint Conference on Arti-ficial Intelligence, researchers warned that the nightmare scenarios depicted in sci-fi films such as 2001: A Space Odyssey, the Terminator and 
Matrix series, Minority Report, and I, Robot could come 
true. “Scientists fear a revolt by killer robots” proclaimed 
the UK’s Sunday Times,1 which highlighted alarming find-
ings at the conference that mankind might lose control of 
computer-based systems that carry out a growing share of 
society’s workload, from chatting on the phone to waging 
war, and have already reached a level of indestructibility 
comparable with the cockroach. For instance, unmanned 
predator drones, which can seek out and kill human tar-
gets, have already moved out of the movie theatre and 
into the theatre of war in Afghanistan and Iraq. While 
presently controlled by human operators, these drones 
are moving toward more autonomous control. Similar 
devices may also soon appear above city streets to carry 
out domestic surveillance. Samsung, the South Korean 
electronics giant, has developed autonomous sentry 
robots with “shoot to kill” capability to serve as armed 
border guards.1
Inspired by the cellular self-destruct 
mechanisms in biological apoptosis, apop-
totic computing offers a promising means 
to develop self-managing computer-based 
systems.
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that some forms of cancer are the result of cells not dying 
fast enough, rather than multiplying out of control, as pre-
viously thought).
Biologists believe that cells are programmed to commit 
suicide through a controlled process known as apoptosis.12 
The term is derived from the Greek word for “to fall off,” in 
reference to dead leaves falling from trees in autumn; like-
wise, cells “fall off” the living organism and die. As Figure 
1a shows, a cell’s constant receipt of “stay alive” signals 
turns off the self-destruct sequence.3 When these signals 
cease, the cell starts to shrink, internal structures decom-
pose, and all internal proteins degrade; thereafter, the cell 
breaks into small, membrane-wrapped fragments to be 
engulfed by phagocytic cells for recycling. Figure 1b con-
trasts apoptosis, also known as “death by default,”11 with 
necrosis, the unprogrammed death of a cell due to injury—
inflammation and the accumulation of toxic substances.13
Recent research indicates that cells receive orders to 
kill themselves when they divide.12 The reason appears 
to be self-protection. An organism relies on cell divi-
sion for maintenance and growth, but the process is also 
dangerous: if just one of the billions of cells in a human 
body locks into division, the result is a tumor. The suicide 
and reprieve controls can be likened to the dual keys of 
a nuclear missile: the suicide signal (first key) turns on 
cell growth but at the same time activates a sequence 
that leads to self-destruction, while the reprieve signal 
(second key) overrides the self-destruct sequence.14
AUTONOMIC AGENTS
Autonomic computing depends on many disci-
plines for its success; not least of these is research in 
agent technologies. There are no assumptions that an 
autonomic architecture must use agents, but agent prop-
erties—adaptability, autonomy, cooperation, and so 
on—complement the paradigm’s objectives. In addition, 
there are arguments for designing complex systems with 
multiple agents,15 providing such systems with inbuilt 
redundancy and greater robustness,16 and for retrofitting 
legacy systems with autonomic capabilities that may ben-
efit from an agent-based approach.17
Figure 2 shows a basic autonomic element (AE), which 
consists of a managed component (MC) and an autonomic 
manager (AM).18 The AM can be a stationary agent—for 
instance, a self-managing cell19 that contains functional-
ity for measurement and event correlation and provides 
support for policy-based control. AMs communicate via 
means such as self-* event messages.
Mobile agents can also play a role in autonomic systems. 
Their ability to reduce network load, overcome network 
latency, encapsulate protocols, execute asynchronously 
and autonomously, adapt dynamically, reflect natural het-
erogeneity, and maintain robustness and fault tolerance 
can make it easier for AMs within different systems to 
cooperate.
APOPTOSIS IN AGENT-BASED  
AUTONOMIC ENVIRONMENTS
Michael S. Greenberg and colleagues first proposed 
agent destruction to facilitate security in mobile-agent 
AUtoNomic SYStem pRopeRtieS
t he general properties of an autonomic, or self-managing, computing system consist of four objectives that represent 
broad system requirements, and four attributes that identify basic 
implementation mechanisms.1,2 
An autonomic system has the following objectives:
•	 Self-configuration. The system must be able to readjust itself 
automatically, either to support a change in circumstances or 
to assist in meeting other system objectives.
•	 Self-healing. In reactive mode, the system must effectively 
recover when a fault occurs, identify the fault, and, when pos-
sible, repair it. In proactive mode, the system monitors vital 
signs to predict and avoid health problems, or to prevent their 
reaching undesirable levels.
•	 Self-optimization. The system can measure its current perfor-
mance against the known optimum and has defined policies 
for attempting improvements. It can also react to the user’s 
policy changes within the system.
•	 Self-protection. The system must defend itself from accidental 
or malicious external attacks, which requires an awareness of 
potential threats and the means to manage them.
To achieve these self-managing objectives, a system must be 
•	 self-aware—aware of its internal state;
•	 self-situated—aware of current external operating conditions 
and context;
•	 self-monitoring—able to detect changing circumstances; and
•	 self-adjusting—able to adapt accordingly.
Thus, to be autonomic a system must be aware of its available 
resources and components, their ideal performance characteris-
tics, and current status. It must also be aware of interconnection 
with other systems, as well as rules and policies for adjusting as 
required. Operating in a heterogeneous environment requires rely-
ing on open standards to communicate with other systems. 
These mechanisms do not exist independently. For example, to 
successfully survive an attack, the system must exhibit self-healing 
abilities, with a mixture of self-configuration and self-optimization. 
This not only ensures the system’s dependability and continued 
operation but also increases self-protection from similar future 
attacks. Self-managing mechanisms must also ensure minimal dis-
ruption to users.
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systems.20 They described an event 
in which network operators de-
commissioned a computer named 
omega.univ.edu and moved its work 
to other machines. A few years 
later, the operators assigned a new 
computer the old name and, to ev-
eryone’s surprise, e-mail arrived, 
much of it three years old; the mail 
had survived “pending” on Inter-
net relays waiting for omega.univ.
edu to come back up. Greenberg’s 
team considered a similar scenario 
in which mobile agents—not rogue 
agents but ones carrying proper 
authenticated credentials—carried 
out work that was out of context 
rather than the result of abnormal 
procedures or system failure. In this 
circumstance, the mobile agents 
could cause substantial damage—
for example, deliver an archaic 
upgrade to part of the network op-
erating system, bringing down the 
entire network.
Misuse involving mobile agents 
can occur in several forms. Agents 
can accidentally or unintention-
ally misuse hosts due to, say, race 
conditions or unexpected emergent 
behavior in those agents. In addi-
tion, external bodies acting upon 
agents, either deliberately or acci-
dentally, can lead to their misuse by 
hosts or other agents—for example, 
due to damage, breaches of privacy, 
harassment, social engineering, 
event-triggered attacks, or compound attacks.
Encryption can prevent situations in which portions 
of an agent’s binary image—monetary certificates, keys, 
information, and so on—could be copied when visiting 
a host. However, agent execution requires decryption, 
which provides a window of vulnerability.20 This situa-
tion is analogous to the body’s vulnerability during cell 
division.3
Figure 3 shows a high-level view of a simple autonomic 
environment with three AEs (a typical system has hun-
dreds, thousands, or even millions of AEs). Each AE is an 
abstract view of Figure 1, and in this case the MCs rep-
resent self-managing computer systems. These AEs can 
have many other lower-level AEs—for example, an auto-
nomic manager for the disk drive—while at the same time 
residing within the scope of a higher-level AM such as a 
system-wide local area network domain’s AE.
Within each AM, heartbeat monitors (HBMs) send “I am 
alive” signals to ensure the continued operation of vital 
processes in the MC and to immediately indicate if any 
fail. The AM has a control loop that continually monitors 
and adjusts, if necessary, metrics within the MC, yet vital 
processes in the MC can also be safeguarded by an HBM 
that emits a heartbeat signal as opposed to its being polled 
by the AM, avoiding lost time (time to next poll) by the AM 
to notice a failure (note in Figure 3 that the left-hand AE 
has an HBM between the AM and a process on the MC). 
Because each AM is aware of its MC’s health via the 
continuous control loop, it can share this information 
by sending a pulse signal (“I am un/healthy”) to another 
AM—in Figure 3, for example, from the left-hand AE to 
the middle AE. This not only allows self-managing options 
if the machines are, say, sharing workload as a cluster 
but protects the AM itself as the pulse signal also acts as 
Normal cell
Apoptosis
Necrosis
Stay
alive
(a) (b)
Figure 1. Biological apoptosis. (a) A cell’s constant receipt of “stay alive” signals turns 
off its programmed self-destruct sequence. (b) Apoptosis versus necrosis due to 
injury.
Figure 2. An autonomic element consists of a managed component and an autonom-
ic manager, which can be a stationary agent. The AM ↔ AM communications module 
includes heartbeat monitoring and pulse monitoring. AMs communicate through an 
autonomic channel via such means as self-* event messages.
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an HBM signal from one AM to another. Thus, if an AE’s 
vital process fails, the neighboring AM will immediately 
become aware of it and, for example, try to restart the 
failed AE or initiate a failover to another AM. This pulse 
signal can also act as a reflex signal between AMs warning 
of an immediate incident—a more direct solution than the 
AM’s processing numerous event messages to eventually 
determine an urgent situation.
Because AMs also monitor the external environment 
(the second control loop), they have a view of their local 
environment’s health. They can encode such information 
into the pulse signal along with self-health data (just as 
our hearts have a double beat). The double-pulse signals 
between the right-hand and center AEs in Figure 3 repre-
sent this situation.
AMs can dispatch mobile agents to work on their 
behalf—for example, to update a set of policies. To help 
provide self-protection in these situations, AMs can send 
apoptosis signals (“stay alive/self-destruct”) to such agents 
by either authorizing continued operation or by with-
drawing such authorization—for example, if the policies 
become out of date. Figure 3 depicts both scenarios.
We refer to the absence of a “stay alive” signal resulting 
in agent self-destruction as strong apoptotic computing, 
or programmed death by default, while weak apoptotic 
computing involves an explicit self-destruct signal—similar 
in principle to the garbage collection method first used 
by Lisp and by many languages since or the destructor 
method in object orientation. The differences in these ap-
proaches are subtle but important. Only a built-in default 
death can guarantee true system safety. For example, you 
would never rely on a self-destruct signal getting through 
to an agent containing system password updates in a 
hostile environment. Likewise, a robot with adaptive ca-
pabilities could learn to ignore such a signal. That said, 
clearly not all circumstances require a death-by-default 
mechanism. However, we believe that many researchers 
using programmed death under the apoptosis descriptor 
should be using programmed death by default.  
There is a concern that denial-of-service attacks could 
prevent “stay alive” signals from reaching their target 
and thereby induce unintentional agent self-destruction. 
DoS attacks could likewise interrupt terminate signals, 
resulting in potentially dangerous scenarios. DoS-immune 
architectures are thus a critical part of next-generation 
self-managing systems.
SWARM SPACE EXPLORATION SYSTEMS 
Space exploration missions by necessity have become 
increasingly autonomous and adaptable. To develop more 
self-sustainable exploration systems, NASA is investigating 
the use of biologically inspired swarm technologies.3 As 
Figure 4 shows, the idea is that swarms of small spacecraft 
offer greater redundancy (and, consequently, greater pro-
tection of assets), lower costs and risks, and the ability to 
explore more remote regions of space than a single large 
craft.
The Autonomous NanoTechnology Swarm mission 
(http://ants.gsfc.nasa.gov), a collaboration between NASA’s 
Goddard Space Flight Center and its Langley Research 
Center, exploits swarm technologies and AI techniques 
to develop revolutionary architectures for both space-
Figure 3. Simple autonomic environment consisting of AEs with autonomic agents (stationary and mobile), heartbeat monitors 
(“I am alive”), pulse monitors (“I am un/healthy”), and apoptosis controls (“stay alive/self-destruct”).
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craft and surface-based rovers. ANTS consists of several 
submissions:
•• The Saturn Autonomous Ring Array consists of a 
swarm of 1,000 pico-class spacecraft, organized as 10 
subswarms with specialized instruments, to perform 
in situ exploration of Saturn’s rings to better under-
stand their constitution and how they were formed. 
SARA will require self-configuring structures for nu-
clear propulsion and control as well as autonomous 
operation for both maneuvering around Saturn’s rings 
and collision avoidance.
•• The Prospecting Asteroid Mission (PAM) also in-
volves 1,000 pico-class spacecraft but with the aim 
of exploring the asteroid belt and collecting data on 
particular asteroids of interest for potential future 
mining operations.    
•• The Lander Amorphous Rover Antenna (LARA) will 
implement new NASA-developed technologies in the 
field of miniaturized robotics, which could form the 
basis of remote lunar landers launched from remote 
sites, as well as offering innovative techniques to 
allow rovers to move in an amoeboid fashion over 
the moon’s uneven terrain. 
The ANTS architecture emulates the successful division 
of labor exhibited by low-level social-insect colonies. In 
such colonies, with sufficiently efficient social interaction 
and coordination, a group of specialists usually outper-
forms a group of generalists. To accomplish their specific 
mission goals, ANTS systems likewise rely on large num-
bers of small, autonomous, reconfigurable, and redundant 
worker craft that act as independent or collective agents.21 
The architecture is self-similar in that ANTS system ele-
ments and subelements can be structured recursively,22 
and it is self-managing, with at least one ruler (AM) per 
ANTS craft.
NASA missions such as ANTS provide a trusted private 
environment, eliminating many agent security issues and 
enabling system designers to focus on ensuring that agents 
are operating in the correct context and exhibiting emer-
gent behavior within acceptable parameters. 
In considering the role of the self-destruct property in-
spired by apoptosis, suppose one of the worker craft in 
the ANTS mission was operating incorrectly and, when 
coexisting with other workers, was causing undesirable 
emergent behavior and failing to self-heal correctly. That 
emergent behavior could put the mission in danger, and ul-
timately the ruler would withdraw the “stay alive” signal.3 
Likewise, if a worker or its instrument was damaged, either 
by colliding with another worker or (more likely) an as-
teroid, or during a solar storm, the ruler would withdraw 
the “stay alive” signal and request a replacement worker. 
Another worker would then self-configure to take on the 
role of the lost worker to ensure optimal balanced coverage 
of tasks to meet the scientific goals. If a ruler or messenger 
was similarly damaged, its ruler would withdraw the “stay 
alive” signal and promote a worker to play its role.
THE EVOLVING STATE OF THE ART 
Several researchers have investigated the apoptotic 
computing concept and its potential applications. 
Christian Tschudin initially suggested using apoptosis 
in highly distributed systems.23 
James Riordan and Dominique Alessandri proposed 
apoptosis as a means to automatically counter the in-
creasing number of security vulnerabilities that hackers 
publish and exploit before systems administrators can 
close them.24 They described an apoptosis service pro-
vider that, should a system vulnerability be found, could 
release a message into the environment to trigger various 
preconfigured responses to shut down the system or warn 
a responsible party. 
Leszek Lilien and Bharat Bhargava argued for apoptosis 
as a means to secure atomic bundles of private data, in 
which the process is activated when detectors determine a 
credible threat exists to the bundle by any host, including 
the bundle’s destination.25  
In drawing parallels between biology and computing, 
Steve Burbeck proposed four interconnected principles for 
managing evolving systems, one of which is apoptosis.26 
As an example of this principle, he cited the Blue Screen 
of Death, a programmed response to an unrecoverable 
error. Burbeck argued that a computer, like a metazoan 
cell, should be able to sense its own rogue behavior, such 
as downloading uncertified code, and disconnect itself 
from the network.
M.M. Olsen, N. Siegelmann-Danieli, and H.T. Siegelmann 
developed a multiagent system called HADES that can 
protect itself via “life” protocols—which control the repli-
cation, repair, movement, and self-induced death of each 
agent—and a “rescue” protocol.27
Madihah Mohd Saudi and colleagues researched 
apoptosis with respect to security systems, focusing on 
Figure 4. NASA’s new space exploration paradigm calls for 
missions involving thousands of small spacecraft rather than 
a single large craft. Image courtesy of NASA.
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network problems, and later applied it specifically to worm 
attacks.28,29
Finally, David Jones implemented apoptotic self-destruct 
and “stay alive” signaling while investigating memory re-
quirements in inheritance versus an abstract-oriented 
approach.30
The majority of these applications fall into the weak 
apoptotic computing (programmed death) category, and 
would likely benefit from, instead, utilizing a strong (pro-
grammed death by default) approach. They also highlight 
the strong need for standards and trust requirements, with 
the immediate challenge of developing a DoS-resistant 
architecture.
T he human body regulates vital functions such as heartbeat, blood flow, and cell growth and death, all without conscious effort. We must develop com-
puter-based systems that can perform similar operations 
on themselves without constant human intervention.
Promising apoptotic computing applications have been 
developed for data objects, highly distributed systems, 
services, agent systems, and swarm systems. However, 
more applied work is needed in other areas, and research-
ers must address the challenges around trust—until then, 
users are not likely to embrace a system with self-destruct 
capabilities.
The case has been made that all computer-based sys-
tems should be autonomic.31 Likewise there is a compelling 
argument that all such systems should be apoptotic, es-
pecially as computing becomes increasingly pervasive 
and ubiquitous. Apoptotic controls should cover all levels 
of human-computer interaction from data, to services, 
to agents, to robotics. With recent headline incidents of 
credit card and personal data losses by organizations and 
governments, and scenarios once relegated to science fic-
tion becoming increasingly possible, programmed death 
by default is a necessity.
We are rapidly approaching the time when new autono-
mous computer-based systems and robots should undergo 
tests, similar to ethical and clinical trials for new drugs, 
before they can be introduced. Emerging research from 
apoptotic computing could guide the safe deployment of 
such systems. 
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